There are many protocols proposed for protecting Radi Frequency Identification (RFID) system privacy and security. A number of these protocols are designed for protecting long-term security of RFID sys tem using symmetric key or public key cryptosystem. Others are designe for protecting user anonymity and privacy. In practice, the use of RFI technology often has a short lifespan, such as commodity checkck out, sup ply chain management and sont and sohermore, we know that designing a long-term security architecture to protect the security and privacy of RFI tags information requires a thorough consideration from many different aspects. However, any security enhancement on RFID technology will jack up its cost which may be detrimental to its widespread deployment. Due to the severe constraints of RFID tag resources (e.g., power source, compu ing power, communication bandwidth) and open air communication natur of RFID usage, it is a great challenge to secure a typical RFID system. For example, computational heavy public key and symmetric key cryptogr phy algorithms (e.g., RSA and AES) may not be suitable or over-killed to protect RFID security or privacy. These factors motivate us to research an efficient and cost effective solution for RFID security and privacy prote tion. In this paper, we propose a new effective generic binary tree base key agreement protocol (called BKAP) and its variations, and show how it can be applied to secure the low cost and resource constraint RFID syste This BKAP is not a general purpose key agreement protocol rather it is a special purpose protocol to protect privacy, un-traceability and anonymi in a single RFID closed system domai key words: RFID security and privacy, key agreement, binary tree, limite resource tag, low cost
Introduction
RFID [1] - [4] is an automatic identification method, relying on storing and remotely retrieving data using devices called RFID tags or transponders. An RFID tag is an object that can be attached to or incorporated into a product, animal, or person for the purpose of identification using radio waves. Chip-based RFID tags contain silicon chips and antennas. Passive tags require no internal power source, whereas active tags require a power source. RFID tags can be used in passports, transportation payments, product tracking, automotive, animal identification, inventory systems, human implants and libraries using its wireless identification characteristic.
A common concern with RFID is privacy risk. Many privacy groups are concerned about the ability to identify and track people when RFID is deployed in real life environment. Another key issue in RFID is security risk. People who use devices that carry personal financial information, such as credit card, do not want others to access their personal information. This is because the radio waves are transmitted into public environment, and this public environment may be monitored or eavesdropped. An adversary can utilize the unique identifier (UID) or electronic product code (EPC) for tracking the object action or obtaining sensitive information. These security problems in low cost RFID systems are raised by R. Damith, and C. Peter in [5] . We were inspired by [5] to survey and analyze existing proposed solutions to secure low cost RFID and found out that the key establishment techniques are the foundation to solve the abovee security problems [6] . Key establishment techniques are also the basis of cryptography based entity authentication protocols [6] . Key agreement protocol (KAP) is one of the major key establishment techniques. Some, researchers have proposed key exchange protocols to protect the privacy and security of RFID [7]- [9] . However, those protocols do not take into consideration all the important factors in RFID technology such as user privacy, security, cost, limited resources and performance at the same time. Thus, we use existing functions of the EPC C1G2 RFID [10] to develop a generic KAP based on binary tree which considers these total factors for the RFID environment.
In this paper, we propose a generic binary tree based key agreement protocol (BKAP) for EPC Class-1 Generation-2 (C1G2) RFID systems. This BKAP is not a general purpose key agreement protocol rather it is a special purpose protocol to protect privacy, un-traceability and anonymity in a single RFID closed system domain. For example, if there is a consumer buys VIAGRA or Cialis, he does not want this privacy information to be disclosed to other people. One can use BKAP to protect his privacy in such cases. However, since the VIAGRA reader used in BKAP to protect the privacy of buying VIAGRA could not be used to exchange keys with the Cialis tags. Similarly, a Cialis reader could not exchange key with VIAGRA tags either. Therefore, BKAP is only good to protect privacy in a single RFID closed system domain. Furthermore, if the UID or EPC code responded by a tag to a reader's query is not varied, then it could be used to track the user's identity and violate the anonymity concern. Since BKAP takes the above factors into consideration, therefore, RFID tags 
Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the terms and the functions for binary tree based KAP (BKAP).
•oe n: A binary tree has n nodes.
•oe Bn: A n-node binary tree.
•oe PT(tree):
To traverse a Bn in postorder.
•oeBpren: A set of Bn, and every Bn has the same preorder sequence and different postorder sequence.
• In our BKAP, the key agreement phase consists of 4 primary steps, and it was shown in Fig. 4 binary tree. They illustrate the whole process of BKAP.
The following procedure 2 describes the creation phase of BKAP. 
EBKAP
From Fig. 4 , we can easily find that the Kmi derived by a Tagi is the same at every key agreement phase. So we can modify a tag memory organization for removing the two functions PT(tree) and Derive(postorder) of the step 2 in the key agreement phase to reduce a tag computing resources and enhance the BKAP performance. The modified tag memory organization is shown in Fig. 8 . The following procedure 3 describes the creation phase of EBKAP. It is similar to BKAP.
Procedure 3 (Creation phase procedure of EBKAP)
(1) Service provider selects a preorder sequence and generates an array Secret[n] which has n elements.
(2) A reader stores the selected preorder sequence and the Secret[n]. It is shown in Fig. 2 .
(3) Service provider generates a unique Bn_i.
(4) The Tags stores the unique Bn_i and the Kmi. It is shown in Fig. 8 .
In the EBKAP, the key agreement phase also consists of 4 primary steps, and it was shown in Fig. 9 
Analysis
The example of BKAP in Sect. 3.2 shows that a tag responds with a variant data (i.e., inorder sequence) to a reader in key agreement phase. This can resist the attack when an adversary uses a constant data to launch tracking attack and eavesdropping attack [5] . Figure 4 shows that an adversary in key agreement phase can eavesdrop RISt and RNr from the air interface. The RISt is a random inorder sequence and is not a constant data, and the RNr is also a random number. This means an adversary can not lunch such a tracking attack with random RISt and RNr. In addition, if the adversary wants to get the Ks, he must know the Psi and the memory content of a tag or the reader in BKAP. The adversary can get the Psi only from brute-force search with RISt, and the time of brute-force searching is the well-known Catalan number.
Analysis of Eavesdropping Attack
(
If a computer needs one microsecond for trying a postorder sequence, and the n is 32, the adversary need about 1,760 years for searching the Psi. In the above analysis, even though the adversary finds the Psi, he does not derive the Kmi without the tag or reader memory content. The adversary only lunches physical attack to get the memory content for analyzing the Ks.
Analysis of the Size of Bpre-postn
We know RISt is generated from Bpre-postn. The size of Bnre-post provides the number of the variances in RISt transmitted from a tag to a reader. The larger the size of Bpre-pos the more difficult an adversary can track a tag. From [12], we learn that the preorder and postorder sequences of two Bn are the same, but their inorder sequences can be different if a Bn changes its subtree of a given node with a single chain topology from left to right or from right to left. So, if Bn_i has a singly linked node, the number of RISt of Tagi are 21=2. If Bn_i has two singly linked nodes, the number of RISt of Tagi are 22=4, and so on. As we mentioned in Sect. 2, we denote that the total singly linked nodes of a binary tree is NNs. Therefore the number of RISt of a Tagi are 2NNs.
Analysis of the Size of Bpren
Because Bn _i is selected from Bpren, we must find how many Bn can be assigned to a tag. The problem is similar to counting the number of binary trees (Bn) can be built from a given set of n nodes. Figure  10 shows the organization of a binary tree.
Let an be the size of Bpren and a0=0.
If the left subtree has k nodes, then the right subtree has n-k-1 nodes, 
Because Eq.
(2) has no close form, we use matlab to calculate the value of the an, and Fig. 11 shows the result.
Performance Analysis of EBKAP

Single Tag Environment
In EBKAP, the computational complexity needed in a tag depends on the procedure of generating RISt. It can be divided into two tasks. The first task is randomly changing the subtree of every singly linked node from left subtree to right subtree or right subtree to left subtree. The program Fig. 10 The definition of a binary tree. Fig. 11 The size of the Bpren.
is shown in Fig.  12 Fig. 16 The simulation result of implementing RAM using Xilinx ISE 9.li.
the tag needs a O(dlogn) stack space. The simulation result in Fig. 15 shows that we use 443 logic gates, 77 FlipFlops, and 18 IO Buffer for realizing the logic of the STACK operations, where d is equal to 10. The EBKAP protocol also needs RAM memory to temporarily store data. The simulation result in Fig. 16 shows that we use 750 logic gates, 421 FlipFlops, and 33 IO Buffer for realizing the logic of the RAM processing. Figure 17 shows the design summary results of realizing the entire EBKAP protocol, which are automatically generated in Xilinx ISE 9.li environment. It is clear to know that the EBKAP with 32-node binary tree requires 3,474 logic gates, 790 FlipFlops, 31 tri-states, and 9 IO Buffer to implement in digital logic.
Multiple Tags Environment
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